Despite its faults the British health system has traditionally been viewed by most Britons as relatively successful. Recently, however, there have been signs of stress. While the cost of the Health Service has grown from £2000m in 1970 to £9400m in 1979, hospital waiting lists have lengthened and staff morale, as shown by labour unrest, has deteriorated. Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Social Services, has warned that doctors, nurses, hospitals, and clinics must begin to be protected from the rising demand for health services and that the public must be educated to lower its expectations for health care.' Concerned about the pressure of increasing health care costs on tax resources, the Government is investigating the possibility of increasing the part that health insurance plays in funding health services. Such a policy, if adopted, would mark a departure from the practice of financing health services almost entirely from tax revenues. But, as Cooper noted, it is important "not to swing from the finding that the NHS has been less than utopian to the advocacy of some other system which may prove to be a good deal worse in practice."2
hospitals, and clinics must begin to be protected from the rising demand for health services and that the public must be educated to lower its expectations for health care . ' Concerned about the pressure of increasing health care costs on tax resources, the Government is investigating the possibility of increasing the part that health insurance plays in funding health services. Such a policy, if adopted, would mark a departure from the practice of financing health services almost entirely from tax revenues. But, as Cooper noted, it is important "not to swing from the finding that the NHS has been less than utopian to the advocacy of some other system which may prove to be a good deal worse in practice." 2 The British and American systems of health care represent quite different approaches to the financing and provision of health care. While private medicine is expanding in Britain, it still forms only a small part of medical care and the NHS is used by about 95% of the population. The British system is perhaps the closest in the non-communist world to a command economy in health care. The NHS has been termed the "only piece of pure socialism" of the postwar Labour government. 3 Over 88% of NHS funds are drawn from general taxation, and services are provided to the public, usually free of charge, through a system of Government-owned hospitals and independent general practitioners under contract to the NHS. The American system is closer to a market economy in health care, with about 60% of health funds coming from private sources: consumers, private health insurance, industry, and philanthropic organisations. For the most part hospitals are owned by private non-profit institutions and most doctors are in private practice. Over 80% of the population carry some type of private health insurance and 70% of personal health care expenditure is paid by third-party payers: government, private insurance, and philanthropists.
From an economic perspective, each health care system needs to accomplish three important tasks. Firstly, a limit must be set on the resources devoted to health care; secondly, a means must be found to determine who will receive the health care; and, thirdly, incentives must be provided so that health care resources are used efficiently. I have attempted to analyse how the British and American systems accomplish these tasks, and to identify the implications for reform of the British system, including insurance financing.
Limiting the resources for health care The The virtual absence of price barriers creates a problem of access. As James Buchanan argued, with zero prices people will demand as consumers more health care than they will willingly finance as taxpayers.6 Queuing is therefore a likely outcome, and indeed queuing, particularly for hospital care, is viewed by some as the major defect in the British system. Cotton Lindsay, in a report critical of the NHS, argues that, "Health care is rationed in the NHS on the basis of people's willingness to suffer delay in its delivery. Access the limits set by the budgetary process. In terms of access zero prices and comprehensive coverage probably promote greater equality of access to health services in the British system but barriers remain and queuing is a problem. Finally, incentives for efficiency in the management of available health care resources are weak in both systems.
This analysis raises serious questions regarding the merits of moving towards a greater use of insurance in financing the NHS. There are, no doubt, those who would argue that it is dangerous to extrapolate from the American experience, given differences in the cultural, political, and social backgrounds of the two systems. But my comparative analysis suggests that the weaknesses of the American health care system are a logical consequence of the incentives provided by extensive third-party coverage. If Britain were to move in the direction of insurance financing, coverage would be even more complete than in the United States. Substantial insurance deductibles or coinsurance* rates, which might lessen the problems of insurance financing by making consumers more cost conscious, are not likely to be required, given the British commitment to equal access and over 30 years of free health care. Hence, the likely outcome of extensive insurance financing in Britain would be higher costs and no visible improvement in health levels. Costs, of course, might be contained by imposing limits on the total expenditure on health care, but if this were done it is difficult to see how an insurance-financed system would differ substantially from a tax-financed system. This does not mean that improvement could not be made in the delivery of health care in Britain; in particular, improved efficiency is needed in the management of resources. This need is likely to grow in the future because of the rapid rate of technological innovation in medicine that promises an increasing array of sophisticated but expensive medical procedures, drugs, and equipment. Certainly, improved information and analysis are necessary, but even more fundamental is the need to change incentives in the British health care system so that such information and analysis is properly used.
William Niskanan suggested that efficiency in government bureaucracies may be improved by providing monetary rewards to bureaucrats.10 Such rewards, he argues, would induce bureaucrats to reduce costs below approved budget levels. These rewards might take the form of personal rewards or allowing bureaucrats to spend a proportion of savings they achieve on a restricted set of allowable activities. The Royal Commission, pursuing a similar line of argument, suggests that NHS budget holders should be permitted to spend budget savings as they think best and possibly be allowed to carry over a greater portion of savings to future budget periods. Inevitably, there is a risk *A deductible is a flat sum of money for medical services which must be paid by patients before their insurance picks up all or a part of the remainder. Coinsurance refers to an arrangement whereby insurance pays only a certain fraction of medical costs incurred by a patient.
that such incentives would encourage budget holders simply to cut back on service provision or quality. Therefore, measures of service output would need to be developed and monitored.
A more radical alternative would be to encourage the development of competing prepaid health plans such as exist in the United States. Consumers enrolled in such plans pay a fixed charge and in return receive comprehensive medical services, including hospital care. The Government could provide health vouchers to consumers, who could use them to enrol in the plan of their choice or to procure NHS services. All health care providers, private and public, would then be reimbursed by the Government on the basis of the number of vouchers received. This would in effect extend to the entire health care system the capitation mechanism already used to reimburse GPs. Health care providers would have an incentive to seek low-cost methods of providing care and, at the same time, competition would provide a check on the quantity and quality of services provided. Such a radical approach requires substantial study before being introduced. As Rudolf Klein noted, such an approach "makes optimistic assumptions about the information available to consumers and about the willingness of health care providers to engage in competition.""' Nevertheless, the American experience with prepaid health care plans suggests that the approach is worth investigating.
The benefits from moving to greater insurance financing of health services are doubtful. Far more promising is an examination of alternative ways to promote incentives among health care providers to seek out more efficient ways of providing services. I believe that without such a change in incentives the NHS will face increasingly severe difficulties in continuing to provide quality health care at a relatively low cost. 
